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Abstract. The current legal and economic infrastructure facilitating
data collection practices and data analysis has led to extreme over-
collection of data and the overall loss of personal privacy. Data over-
collection has led to a secondary market for consumer data that is in-
visible to the consumer and results in a person’s data being distributed
far beyond their knowledge or control. In this paper, we propose a Data
Market framework and design for personal data management and privacy
protection in which the individual controls and profits from the dissem-
ination of their data. Our proposed Data Market uses a market-based
approach utilizing blockchain distributed ledgers for data distribution
transparency and control and digital rights management technologies to
provide for data confidentiality and secure distribution of the data. Our
market framework and design provides an economic, legal, and advanced
technology infrastructure that protects an individuals’ right to privacy
while nurturing a flourishing information economy.
1 Introduction
The rise of big data analysis techniques and technologies have provided us with
an unprecedented insight into both ourselves and the world around us. While this
insight can be powerfully educational, we are also beginning to experience some
of the ramifications of vast data collection and its usage to gain these insights.
One of the key casualties in the rise of data is informational privacy; as our ability
to process wider arrays and larger volumes of data increases, so does the demand
for data that reveals the intimate personal details of everyday life. The vast col-
lection and storage of this data in Internet-connected databases has dramatically
increased the risk of privacy breaches while providing for the easy dissemination
of this data worldwide. Data that may have previously been thought of as in-
nocuous or difficult to obtain, such as an individual’s Web browsing history or
aggregated medical data, can now be leveraged to exploit more pointed vulnera-
bilities and gain private insights into individuals even when those individuals are
not explicitly identified in the data itself. Infamously, Massachusetts Governor
William Weld had his medical data re-identified from a supposedly de-identified
insurance data set in 1997, purportedly by cross-referencing this medical data
set with a publicly available Cambridge, Massachusetts voter registry list [4].
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A consequence of the increased demand for data about individuals is the
existence of flourishing secondary information markets. Companies like Google
and Facebook have become multi-billion dollar firms from a business model that
involves attracting consumers to a free, useful service, collecting the consumers’
data as they use these services, and selling this raw or analyzed data to other
businesses. On a surface level, it’s easy to point to the resultant economic boom
arising from this business model as a net societal benefit. After all, the usual
outcome of a successful industry is job creation and economic stimulus, like
with American manufacturing in the post World War II era. However, in the
current information market, this economic benefit is not equitably distributed
to all participants. As our data, that is, data collected about us as individuals,
becomes more vast and, therefore, more powerful and more intimate, we must
in turn be more mindful of how our data is gathered and propagated in order to
ensure our personal privacy.
The first stage in this model of data brokerage, involving consumers receiving
a free or discounted service in exchange for personal information, has not evolved
much since the early days of grocery store surveys. Where the value of data
has increased significantly is in the secondary data market, where primary data
collectors sell their users’ data. Whereas the primary data collection is usually
done with the consumer’s consent and compensates the data originator, i.e., the
consumer, for the sacrifice of his or her privacy, transactions on the secondary
information market are done without the consumers’ knowledge, consent, or
immediate benefit since the profits are collected entirely by the primary collector
selling the data. The ability to gain value from the analysis of huge data sets
combined with the ease with which such data sets may be created and distributed
with modern networks and computing systems has resulted in a data economy
rife with over-collection and over-distribution of private data.
We propose a public Data Market as one mechanism that can be used to
address the over-sharing of private information. In the Data Market, users can
exert control over their own data, including control over their data distribution
to secure their information from rampant re-brokerage on the secondary market.
Rather than individuals selling their unrestricted, raw private data to primary
collectors who solely profit from its distribution, individuals would instead sell
licenses for use of their data. Data collectors can still analyze an individual’s
data under terms governed by the license, but they would not be able to sell and
distribute that data unless authorized under the license.
Fundamentally, the use of licenses is necessary because primary data col-
lectors have shown to be poor faith actors when given total access to private
information. Before the spread of personal computers and growth in Internet
users, data collectors were often limited to collecting information about indi-
viduals in their local area, and had limited distribution networks to propagate
that information. As a result, data collectors like local banks and retail stores
typically used collected data internally rather than sharing it externally [24].
Only a few primary data brokers existed that would aggregate data from mul-
tiple primary data collectors. Internet infrastructure, along with relaxation of
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data collection regulations, changed the data collection landscape - sharing and
redistributing data became far cheaper and accordingly far more profitable than
just internal use. Therefore, methods to curb the redistribution of data about
individuals is necessary.
The digital rights management framework and technologies used to safeguard
against copyright information in digital media can be applied in the same way
to private data and information. Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems
have been utilized in the past to protect digital media like video games and
music by only allowing certain approved playback devices access the protected
media, as well as, by digitally watermarking the distributed media. Historically,
DRM systems have proven to be notoriously simple to break. Good actors and
caretakers of data will faithfully use DRM systems and abide by their data license
agreements. Bad actors will bypass the DRM safeguards; however, compromised
and stripped DRM systems are easily detected during an audit. Thus, good
actors and corporations are incentivized to use only DRM protected data.
Previous concerns over a data market have generally hinged on the admin-
istrative costs of policing a market. Kenneth Laudon [15] proposed a National
Information Market in 1997, but his model relied on extensive government reg-
ulation and an army of investigators to ensure compliance with the marketplace
rules. To address compliance, we use blockchain technology to publicly moni-
tor transactions in our Data Market. The development of blockchain distributed
ledgers allows accounting and policing of a market to be carried out democrat-
ically, rather than by a central bureaucracy. Each data transaction in our Data
Market will result in a transaction block added to an immutable chain of data
blocks that is distributed across multiple servers. In this way, we can easily
differentiate legally obtained data from illegally obtained data by whether the
according transaction is registered in the public ledger.
Our Data Market uses blockchain distributed ledgers so that all data trans-
actions are logged in a publicly accessible distributed ledger. Blockchains have
proven very successful in managing transactions of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin,
and a similar implementation can be added in our data market. A blockchain
stores a record of each data transaction. These records can be used to deter-
mine authorized licensees and to ensure that data licensees are not violating
the terms of their license. Legitimately obtained private data can be tracked by
locating the associated data blocks in the block chain, verifying its authentic-
ity. By contrast, illegally obtained data will have no such addition to the block
chain in addition to compromised or no DRM protection on the data itself. The
blockchain’s immutability property allows identification of illegally propagated
data, and the offending parties can be penalized accordingly.
In the remainder of this paper, we present a more detailed view of our pro-
posed Data Market. In Section 2 we present a brief overview of modern large
scale data collection practices. We examine the legal and market landscape for
data privacy and ownership in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine in more detail
three of the most common data collection practices. We present our Data Market
concept details in Section 5. We summarize our concept in Section 6.
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2 Modern Data Collection
The economic infrastructure of data collection is a chief cause of the resultant
over-collection of our data. Simply put, at present, it is profitable for data col-
lectors to obtain as much data about individuals, that is, our data, as possible.
A primary objective of our proposed Data Market is to correct the unaddressed
externalities, in particular the lack of oversight on collection and distribution of
our data, that has led to over-collection of data, and, through this oversight, to
reduce data collection to an acceptable, or at least observable, level.
The concept of supply and demand is intrinsically tied to the distribution
of scarce resources. However, a key distinction separating our data from other
tangible goods is the lack of any concept of scarcity. While there are physical
limitations on how much data can be collected, like a small user base for an
application or a lack of appropriate back-end storage systems, once collected,
data can be copied and redistributed an infinite number of times at essentially
























Fig. 1. The current data transaction model. Primary data collectors are allowed to
freely re-distribute collected data to any foreign parties, without any approval necessary
by the original data owner.
Privacy is intimately related to the unchecked distribution of our data. Pri-
vacy is generally defined in the data context as the ability to control the distri-
bution and flow of one’s personal data [21]. In the case of consumers volunteering
personal information about themselves, we can discuss the actual transaction in
terms of the brokered privacy rather than brokered data. Individual privacy is
a finite good unlike personal data. With unchecked data distribution, once an
individual surrenders personal information to a data collector, the individual no
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longer has control over the distribution and flow of that data - or rather, they
have ceded a portion of their control to the data collector. And, the data owner
must trust the data collector to not further distribute their data or simply ac-
cept that they, as the data owner, have ceded their data to not just the data
collector, but to many unknown data collectors and data aggregators.
The market value of privacy rather than the market value of data has been
explored in multiple articles and books [10][20][11]. The market for privacy from
secondary data brokerage suffers from a more classic economic problem: that of
externalities. While data collection firms are reaping the full benefit from data
brokerage, they are not bearing the full cost of collection and transmission of
data. Data breaches can cost companies millions of dollars in restitution and
fines, but this amount pales in comparison to the value lost in undiscovered data
breaches [19]. Proliferation of private data bears a significant privacy cost on the
original data owner, where the risk of foreign data breaches or re-identification
of aggregated data is taken by the data owner, i.e., the individual the data
corresponds to, rather than the data collector. As a natural consequence, data
collectors are encouraged to aggressively over-collect individual data as they are
internalizing the full benefit of collection, but externalizing some of the costs [22].
Fundamentally, negative externalities like over collection arise from ill-defined
property rights. Coase’s Theorem [6] states that if property rights can be nego-
tiated costlessly, the socially optimal economic outcome will be achieved in the
presence of a negative externality. In the context of a data market, this theorem
states that as long as data ownership rights can be costlessly negotiated between
data owners, purchasers, and collectors, the equilibrium level of collection will
settle at some socially optimal level as illustrated in the black lines of Figure 2
while subsidized demand will result in some higher price as illustrated in the red
line of Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Supply-demand model of current data market. When the costs of collecting
data are externalized by the collecting firms, the optimal level of data collection is
exceeded.
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In practice, the assumption of costless negotiation is rarely met. Asymmetry
of information in contract and technology structure between data-generating
individuals and the collecting firms means that an extremely small minority of
the population is actually aware of what data they are generating and the true
value of that data. Additionally, as more and more industries have shifted to the
Internet, the need for individuals to maintain an online profile, by which they
generate significant amounts of data seamlessly and with every interaction, has
become increasingly necessary. Opting out of online data transactions is simply
not a possibility for many businesses and individuals, resulting in a concurrent
increase in the number of primary data collectors and in the potential data
breaches. Negotiating data rights between every single entity privy to one’s data
would undoubtedly be an extremely costly negotiation process. For something as
simple as purchasing an item online, a socially optimal level of data collection can
be obtained only if the purchaser can negotiate data property rights separately
with his or her bank, credit card company, market intermediary, seller, ISP, and
OS proprietor at the bare minimum. In practice, any number of third party
software and hardware vendors would also need to be involved depending on the
configurations of the purchaser’s home network and the various websites and
payment services involved. It’s clear that there is really no practical notion of
costless negotiation of data rights in the modern implementation of the Internet.
Thus, the issue of externalized costs must be addressed in a different way to
preserve a sustainable information economy that protects data rights.
3 Data Privacy and Ownership
Free market economics often elicit the need for legislation to correct market in-
efficiencies or imbalances, such as the Internet’s cost-benefit asymmetry of data
collection that significantly favors the data collectors over the privacy rights of
the individual. One solution to this imbalance is the recognition of property
rights that individuals have over their data. Data is recognized to have signif-
icant value and to pose violations of privacy rights when distributed beyond
the data owner’s control. Therefore, data is property in an era of the Internet
and Artificial Intelligence (AI), and the existing property and privacy legisla-
tion should be applied to protect individuals and their data. Additionally, data
specific legislation may be passed that would grant individuals autonomy over
their personal data, prohibit sales and brokerage of their data, and prosecute
parties illegitimately trading in owner’s data thereby explicitly recognizing that
personal data is just like any other physical form of property. Currently in the
United States, data is not recognized as being owned by any one entity, let alone
the individual without whom the data doesn’t exist. Protections like the Fourth
Amendment exist to guard against certain unauthorized access to private data,
but the data itself is not considered to be privately owned [21]. In the con-
text of online privacy, this means that while individuals are legally protected
against involuntary access to their data, there are no mechanisms for ensuring
that voluntarily surrendered information about themselves will not propagate
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beyond their initially surrendered intentions. In fact, nearly all of the privacy
statements that all users are forced to agree to in order to use an Internet service
or application, both essential and non-essential services and applications alike,
provide for the service or application provider, and even some third parties, to
use any and all collected data in a manner of their choosing. Simply visiting
a website can result in your data being stolen by third parties without your
knowledge or actual consent.
Notable exceptions to the lack of property recognition afforded to data are
intellectual property rights and trade secret rights. Intellectual property is es-
sentially legally protected information, with rights officially granted via patents.
Patents give the holder sole proprietorship over the information as stipulated
in the patent. More specifically, patent rights allow a patent holder to exclude
others from using the invention claimed in the patent. While the domain of
what is considered intellectual property remains fairly narrow, the definition is
easily expanded to include private information although the process to claim
those rights under the current patent system may prove to be cumbersome and
unworkable. Trade secret rights, however, protect proprietary data and infor-
mation against commercial use by others. Data about an individual is clearly a
trade secret, and misappropriation of trade secrets is forbidden by the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) [26] and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 [3].
While these Acts target corporate trade secrets, their wording is broad enough
to cover the huge data captured about individual’s in a world that did not exist
when these Acts were passed. Attaching intellectual property rights to private
data would at least move to balance the incentive structure of the current mar-
ket - firms can no longer externalize the costs of data collection. A 1998 study
showed that between a third to a quarter of Internet users would be willing to re-
veal demographic information in exchange for some benefit, indicating that there
are profitable transactions to be made [13]. And, it is this trading of personal
data for some benefit that is at the foundation of some of the largest companies
such as Alphabet and Facebook. However, beyond the immediate benefit of the
service or application, users obtain no direct benefit or compensation from the
subsequent use, sale, or distribution of their data.
Trading personal data and information need not be completely illegal, but
to ensure sustainable transaction volumes, the original owners must be compen-
sated fairly and not be forced to relinquish all rights to data that is about them.
Currently, the law grants intellectual property rights to “promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” [2]. While personal
data is not noted directly in this list, it does fall under this purview as a writing,
and recognizing patent protections to private data would allow clear avenues to
trace back data origination and ensure the proper parties are compensated for
sacrificing their privacy.
An early application of intellectual property rights towards online data arose
in the form of digital rights management systems in the early 2000s. Digital
Rights Management (DRM) systems arose in response to the proliferation of
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peer-to-peer file sharing popularized by Napster [9][5]. Prior to digital record
transmission, recorded entertainment such as music and video games were dis-
tributed via physical media, on game discs and compact discs (CDs). With the
advent of digital media and file sharing, the supply of multimedia became virtu-
ally infinite. To combat legitimately purchased music from circulating illegally
on the secondary file sharing network, the entertainment industries implemented
digital rights software into their products in order to limit what users could do
with purchased data.
Under a digital rights management system, rather than selling the actual
data, vendors instead sell licenses to access the data. Any consumer wishing to
access the data must do so through a clearing house, which reimburses the origi-
nal vendor appropriately[16]. The licenses usually come with safeguards against
digital copying, as well as, time and machine limits. Theoretically, DRM systems
would ensure that only legitimate purchasers of that data would have access to it.
Registered playback devices would be required to “unlock” the encrypted data,
and non-registered devices would be identified and barred from access by the
DRM system. Early implementations of digital rights management mainly ap-
plied to digital sales of music and video games, aided by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1996. The Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) crimi-
nalized attempts to circumvent digital rights management, attaching penalties
to illegal cracking and redistribution of protected media.
4 Common Data Collection Practices
Awareness of data collection mechanisms is central to any meaningful discussion
of data privacy and data management. Enforcement of a data market model
is not possible without some reasonable awareness of how our digital footprint
is being monitored and tracked, both with and without our knowledge and/or
consent. In this section, we present an overview of some of the most common
data collection practices today; affinity cards and credit cards, web cookies, and
mobile device location tracking.
4.1 Affinity Cards and Credit Cards
Credit cards were an early example of corporate data collection, used to analyze
consumer behavior long before individuals started generating digital footprints
on the Internet. In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled that state anti-usury laws
could not be applied to national banks operating in that state [1]. As a result of
this ruling, operating costs for national banks lowered significantly. Banks took
advantage of this opportunity by widening their credit card marketing campaigns
to gain customers nationwide [24].
This nationalization of credit markets resulted in significant increases in de-
mand for consumer information, not just in one’s local area but from corpo-
rations all over the country. The banks were shortly followed by retailers and
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manufacturers, who offered their own co-branded affinity cards as a service, en-
ticing consumers by offering low fees on corporate credit cards and cash rebates
for affinity cards. All of these benefits were provided in exchange for purchasing
and credit history information [24]. As a result, corporations could gain nearly
full access into an individual’s purchasing history and current consumer behav-
ior with that corporation simply by tracking purchases made with the corporate
card or tied into an affinity card. Affinity cards are now commonplace at re-
tailers, and physical cards are often replaced by simply entering an associated
phone number.
4.2 Cookies
A powerful tool used by data collectors is the web cookie. Cookies were origi-
nally implemented to mitigate the disadvantages of stateless Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP). Under this Internet communication protocol, the client-side
browser and the web server interact for only as long as it takes for a request and
a response to be received, before disconnecting. In this manner, HTTP requests
are essentially “stateless” - the state of the request is not maintained when a new
request is instantiated [14]. While statelessness makes client-server interactions
easier to facilitate, it may cause issues in sites that do want to preserve state
between requests, such as an online shopping site that wants to remember what
a customer is putting in their shopping cart [14]. Cookies mitigate this problem
by storing required state information, and passing this state information back
and forth between the web client and web server.
Cookies become a privacy concern when the information they collect and
store becomes shared outside of the user’s knowledge and control. As websites
have become more complex, they commonly request other third party servers
for certain functionality, particularly advertisements, potentially transmitting
the client’s information to the third party site that then installs its own cookie
on the user’s machine. When the user is unaware of the cookies being installed on
their machines, they are no longer in control of that information and have thus
lost privacy [14]. In modern applications, flash cookies have been implemented
in conjunction with the traditional HTTP cookies, making cookie removal even
harder [23]. Additionally, data collectors such as Facebook and other marketing
companies now commonly embed cookies in wholly unrelated sites for the sole
purpose of monitoring consumers’ online behavior. This is most certainly done
without the consumers’ knowledge and approval.
Oftentimes the user has no ability to consent to or refuse certain cookies
without losing access to the desired webpage - at least in the United States. As
cookies have evolved from information to enable user-friendly functionality into
essentially spyware, the ability to opt in or out of cookie usage has become a
larger privacy issue. This is magnified in the case of third party cookies, in which
a foreign site inserts cookies into a wholly unrelated site in order to monitor user
behavior. When discussing third and tertiary party data brokerage, cookies are a
prime example of how data is actually transferred between entities. Advertisers
often make deals with individual webpages in order to allow the advertiser to
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embed their cookies in the child page and monitor the site’s users’ behavior from
afar.
To curb the proliferation of cookies, the European Union passed the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018. This legislation set restrictions
on which cookies were allowed, limiting data controllers to personal information
processing only with the user’s consent or with a proven legal basis [8]. Effec-
tively, this meant web cookies needed to either be necessary to the functioning of
the website and model the initial concept of a state-preserving storage device, or
be opt-in from the user, allowing the user to select which cookies are desired for
functionality and which cookies to forgo. American websites, by contrast, either
make no mention of the cookies supported or present cookies as an opt-out ser-
vice thereby rendering paid or otherwise state-needing operations unworkable.
This all or nothing cookie approach greatly increases the number of site visitors
that end up with cookies from unwanted and unauthorized data collectors.
A 2019 study by Dabrowski, Merzdovnik, Ullrich, Sendera, and Weippl [8]
measured the GDPR’s effect on cookie load faced by visitors to the top 100,000
websites, as ranked by Alexa. The authors found that, when compared to cookie
load in 2016, almost half of the top 1,000 websites used some form of geographic
discrimination to limit the persistent cookies installed on European user’s ma-
chines while installing significantly more cookies on machines from other juris-
dictions. The study also found that cookie load was reduced by 46.7% for US
consumers as well when compared to 2016, suggesting that GDPR regulations
have been successful in limiting unnecessary cookie usage in Internet traffic.
4.3 Mobile Devices
An even more recent and omnipresent development in information collection is
the ubiquity of cellular phones. In a privacy context, each phone’s ability to store
and report to a plethora of different applications its owner’s location information,
in real time, is worrisome. Modern smartphones not only have the capability to
record the holder’s location at all times, but are actually mandated to do so by
the U.S. Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC’s) Enhanced 911 Phase II,
put into effect in October 2001. The E911 mandates that the caller’s longitude
and latitude be broadcast in the event of a 911 call. Cell phones are constantly
tracking their owner’s location via WiFi access points and GPS signals, and
the resultant location information can be used in many ways, from innocuous
advertising to tracking fugitives, as was the case in the arrest of John McAfee
(he was located using embedded location information from a selfie posted by a
fan [12]).
Mobile phones are not the only device that tracks our location information.
The increasing popularity of radio frequency identification (RFID) enabled de-
vices also contributes to the constant mapping of people’s physical location. Bus
passes, vehicle toll systems, credit cards, and building access cards are all ex-
amples of RFID-enabled devices that help facilitate device verification. RFID
devices’ popularity stems from the low cost and small size needed to perform
these automated operations, but also raise security concerns over the devices’
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tendencies to communicate promiscuously with all frequency-synchronized read-
ers [17]. Leech attacks on unsecured RFID devices can be carried out by sur-
reptitiously reading the RFID tags, and replicating or storing the tag data on
a “ghost” device [17]. Users of all forms of mobile devices must also place a lot
of trust in the collecting entity to secure their data against data breaches and
also against secondary propagation. A 2013 study [17] showed that 95% of indi-
viduals could be identified given only 4 spatio-temporal data points. This study
showed that de-identification of anonymized location data points can be done
almost trivially, meaning that any secondary dissemination of location data will
allow the secondary collector to immediately identify users even if the data is
intended to be anonymous.
5 The Data Market
To address the issues with the current state of data brokerage and distribution,
we propose a voluntary primary data market, the Data Market, in which indi-
viduals have control over the distribution of their data. Users participating in
this market would have property rights over their personal data and informa-
tion, and they would be compensated for all transactions concerning their data
and information. The main goal of this market is to reduce the informational
and control asymmetry present in the current market, wherein secondary data
brokerage leads to user data being propagated to third parties that the origi-
nal owner knows nothing about. Therefore, our new market needs to be able
to both fluidly process primary data exchanges while also limiting re-use and
re-distribution of that data.
The primary benefit of this Data Market would be equalizing the asymme-
try in the cost/benefit structure of the existing data brokerage system. Rather
than allow data collectors to internalize the full benefit of personal data and
externalizing some of the costs, we propose that licenses for access to raw data
and information replace the primary collection of raw data itself. In this man-
ner, collected data can be traced back to the original owner and he/she may be
compensated adequately in the event of data redistribution, thereby minimizing
some of the existing asymmetry. If the incentive structure is balanced, market
forces will allow for a socially optimal level of data collection and compensation,
where we can both reap the benefits of a thriving Data Market while still pre-
serving some level of personal privacy. As mentioned in Coase’s theorem, a key to
solving market inefficiencies is the ability to negotiate costlessly. This principle
is not achieved in any practical manner in the current data infrastructure, nor
is it likely to be achieved in our vision of a market. However, if a set of central
standards is developed that dictates the terms of data brokerage, we can vastly
reduce the cost of negotiation and narrow the inequalities present in current data
collection practices.
Authentication is essential to this economy, as we must be able to differen-
tiate parties that have legitimately purchased access to private data from those
who obtain the data illegally. To this end, we propose that sales of data would
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consist of selling licenses to data, as opposed to selling ownership of the data
itself. Under a similar approach to digital rights management, users can con-
trol the transmission of their personal information by licensing their data rather
than ceding full control to the primary purchaser. In this way, an owner’s data
is treated just like software and creative works of art. Instead of requiring indi-
vidual negotiations, the license terms will be set centrally by a legislative body,
allowing users and collectors alike to circumvent an expensive negotiation pro-
cess. Although removing negotiating power from both parties disallows pareto
efficiency in our Data Market, the present informational asymmetry in data col-
lection legislation and technology precludes a meaningful negotiation process
anyways.
Our Data Market will make use of modern iterations of digital rights man-
agement systems as well as blockchain distributed ledgers in order to facilitate
privacy regulations and data transmissions in the Marketplace. DRM systems
provide a base level of security protection, protecting licensed data from be-
ing exploited outside the terms of the license. And, blockchain ledgers will im-
mutably record transactions and ensure the veracity of data transactions within
the market.
In the remainder of this section, we further expound upon various aspects of
our Data Market proposal.
5.1 Technology
In our Data Market implementation, modern digital rights management tech-
nology will facilitate the initial transaction of data, provide safeguards against
illegal secondary data sales, and provide a secondary auditing mechanism. Tra-
ditional cryptography runs on the assumption that in a two-party communique,
the sender trusts the receiver with the raw, unencrypted data. Most common
symmetric key cryptographic protocols follow this model, and they are designed
to make the transmissions inaccessible to parties without the required key while
allowing the key holder free access to the transmitted data. However, DRM sys-
tems evolved because the receiver in a DRM transaction cannot be trusted with
the unencrypted data, but they need access to the data for their personal use.
To achieve this asymmetry in usability and visibility, content under DRM
is generally encrypted using a modified public/private key schema. Public key
cryptography uses a pair of mathematically related keys (typically referred to as
a public key and a private key) for authentication, encryption, and decryption.
Data encrypted by a user’s public key can be decrypted only by the corre-
sponding private key, and vice versa. Both parties in a public key cryptography
schema have access to the other’s public key but not the other’s private key.
By keeping one’s private key a secret, we ensure that only the entity with the
right public-private key pair can access the unencrypted data [25]. By using a
modified public/private key scheme, digital rights management adds a layer of
authentication and confidentiality to a data transaction. As the Data Market is
not transmitting raw data but licenses to access data instead, DRM affords a
level of protection against unwanted copying and redistribution of data.
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Fig. 3. The basic digital rights management model of usability.
Figure 3 illustrates the basic operation and use of a DRM protected block of
data. The DRM protected data is encrypted with a private key that affords both
confidentiality and origin authentication protection. The DRM protected data is
sent to a DRM enabled playback device. A DRM enabled playback device may
be an application specific device such as an MP3 player, or it may be a general
purpose computer or server running a DRM enabled application. A DRM enabled
playback device contains the corresponding public key that enables decryption
of the DRM protected data. Note that even though the public key is referred
to as “public” the public key is, in fact, kept secret within the DRM enabled
playback device. Multiple DRM enabled playback devices may be authorized
to access a certain block of DRM protected data. Each of these devices would
contain the public key for that block of DRM protected data.
In the extreme, each block of data is protected by a unique public/private
key pair. And, all authorized DRM enabled playback devices would need to
obtain the corresponding public key from the Data Market in order to access
the DRM protected data. This follows the traditional DRM architecture and
operations [25].
In addition to authentication, the data license governs usage of the data. To
combat the open propagation of data between tertiary sources, the license sets
the terms on what can be done with the data, notably that resale without the
original owner’s knowledge and consent is prohibited. To aid enforcement of the
license terms, data distributed with DRM contains a digital watermark, further
verifying its authenticity. Any illegitimately shared data will not contain the wa-
termark, so fraudulent data can be easily identified. This is frequently done using
cryptographically secure hash functions as well as digital certificates [16]. Ad-
ditional monitoring software can be distributed along with the license, in order
to make sure that all uses of purchased data is in accordance with the license.
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Some early implementations of DRM suffered from the overhead required for
asymmetric authentication; however, the exponentially more powerful proces-
sors and larger volume of active memory allotted to modern computing devices
means the overhead from public key cryptography, for DRM purposes at least,
is negligible.
DRM as a standalone system can be broken relatively easily. Consequently,
simply distributing data licenses governed by DRM will not ensure full security
against redistribution of data. To lend some transparency to all data sales, we
utilize the blockchain as a public distributed ledger of all data sales. All data
sales are logged in the blockchain, and transactions are verified in the same
manner bitcoin transactions are verified - democratically, by checking the hash
values of each transaction and adding the transactions to the blockchain. In
that manner, every transaction can be tracked, and users can audit transmission
of their own data. In contrast to proposals such as the National Information
Market [15], there would be no need to impose significant government resources
into policing our Data Market - it can be policed publicly instead, while still
maintaining anonymity and privacy. In our proposed Market, a publicly viewable
blockchain will be set up that will record all data transactions. Each block will
have the parties’ public keys available, which provides both anonymity in hiding
the parties’ true identities and concurrently provides security by validating the
identities of the parties [18]. Using a centralized ledger as such would allow public
monitoring of data propagation. If a company owns or has access to data that
does not correspond to a block in the blockchain, the entire market will know
that they obtained that data either illegally or through some private secondary
market.
Block X+1
Data: H(Data Block X) + 
Data X+1
Block X+2







Data Block X: H(Data 
Block X-1) + Data X
Fig. 4. A diagram of the block chain. Each block contains the hash of the previous block
prepended onto the incoming data, ensuring the block chain’s immutability. Incoming
data blocks must solve a mathematical equation in order to be verified and added to
the chain.
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Analogous to bitcoin mining, before adding a transaction to the blockchain,
the transaction must be verified. Transactions are aggregated into blocks as
shown in Figure 4 prior to their addition to the blockchain. Adding data blocks
to the blockchain is usually done by providing a proof of work involving finding
a nonce that, when appended onto both the hash of the previous block and
the current block, produces a hash value lower than a certain target [7]. The
target value is set by the network in an attempt to enforce a certain transaction
rate - for bitcoin, this rate is set globally and adjusted to match the desired
transaction rate. Our market can implement a similar system in order to prevent
block verification crossover and ensure the integrity of the blockchain.
Another advantage of blockchain technology is the reduction in overhead
due to the decentralized system. Examples of centralized systems are notaries
or other document certification systems, where that authority is responsible for
providing proof of integrity, ownership, and existence [7]. In a data rich market,
forcing all transactions to be approved by one entity could lead to bottlenecks
and significant delays. Decentralizing the verification of each block can essentially
parallelize the verification checks and lead to cheaper and faster transactions.
5.2 Behavior in the Market
The Data Market provides an open and visible marketplace where data owners
and even primary data collectors can sell their data. Effectively, the Data Market
operates as the secondary market clearinghouse for data owners and primary
data collectors. By moving the secondary market to the Data Market, individuals
will gain visibility and potential monetary gains from the secondary sale of their
data. This market is achievable even if a subset of data collectors and subset of
data owners agree to this model. However, there is little doubt data collectors
will have their business model changed from this implementation, as they will
be restricted from resale without violating license agreements. This limits the
economic incentive for data collectors to switch. Public shaming and/or legal
means to ensure cooperation may be necessary. If the population, and, therefore,
the state, deems diminishing privacy a large enough threat to social welfare
and national security, legislation can be passed to ensure that a democratically
governed public Data Market is the most profitable option for all participants
in data brokerage.
Although digital rights management and blockchain provide a base level of
data security in our Market, there still need to be enforceable legal consequences
to ensure cooperation in the Data Market. The blockchain allows identification
of illegal data holders, but without proper legal consequences there are no in-
centives to refrain from violating the license terms and redistributing data as
occurs now. Existing regulations like the DMCA and intellectual property laws
must be applied to licensed data, with the according penalties for violations. In
accord, licensed data in the Market would be subject to Fair Use doctrines. Al-
though we are essentially copyrighting all data collected by Market participants,
certain use cases will allow delicensing of this data for secondary propagation.
For example, data collected for academic purposes that is then published will
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likely fall under fair use. Authors of a study would not then need to compensate
the study participants every time their study is cited. However, consumer data
that is sold privately for marketing purposes would not have the same fair use
circumvention. Ultimately, the goal of our Data Market is not to completely
curb secondary data propagation, but rather to set limits on the volume of such
transactions.
6 Summary
We present a novel implementation framework for a primary Data Market in
which individuals have control over the outflow of their own personal informa-
tion. Our Data Market framework and design provides an economic, legal, and
advanced technology infrastructure that protects an individuals’ right to privacy
while preserving a flourishing information economy. This Data Market allows so-
cially responsible companies to collect data in an ethical and transparent manner
and maintain a healthy information economy without overly jeopardizing our
personal privacy. Once we finally legally recognize individuals’ rights to control
their own information flow, our proposed Data Market mechanisms will manage
data transactions and information outflow, ensuring participants a higher level
of privacy than at present.
In this market, rather than data collectors amassing raw data at will, raw data
must be licensed by its original owner, i.e., the individual about whom the data
relates, at an agreed upon price that can be set through market dynamics. The
license will restrict redistribution of licensed data, disallowing collectors from
freely propagating their customers’ data for their own profit. All secondary sales
of licensed data must be approved by the original owner, and must redistribute a
portion of the transaction back to the original owner. The preference, of course, is
that secondary sales transact through the Data Market with one entity receiving
a finder’s fee or brokerage fee for supporting the transaction. In this manner, the
problem of cost externalities can be mitigated. Since the data owner is the one
at risk in the event of a security breach or data loss, they must be compensated
for taking that risk. The Data Market utilizes digital rights management and
blockchain technology to enforce the privacy regulations set by our market, in
order to protect licensed data and monitor data transactions respectively.
Primary data collection mechanisms are unlikely to change with or without
a Data Market. We discuss the roles of cookies, affinity cards, and location data
in reducing our privacy, but those devices also serve many functional purposes.
Eliminating or penalizing primary data collection that the user benefits from is
not the goal of our Data Market. Our concerns revolve around the redistribution
of private data that benefits only the data collectors and not the users at all.
Rampant secondary and tertiary redistribution of collected data is the primary
threat to our privacy, as we have no knowledge and no control over the flow of our
data once we release it to a primary collector. The Data Market will re-establish
participants’ control over their data even when released to a primary collector,
ensuring that secondary propagation must be allowed by the original owner
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and that sales must compensate the original owner. Conversely, data collectors
participating in the Market will still have the opportunity to profitably collect
and analyze data for their own purposes, and may still benefit from propagating
that data. We expect that a stable equilibrium rate of data transactions will
be achieved in this Data Market, allowing everyone to benefit fully from the
knowledge in our data without overly sacrificing our fundamental privacy.
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